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BOOK REVIEWS
Crime and Insanity. Edited by Richard W. Nice.
Philosophical Library. 1958. Pp. vii, 280. $6.00.

New York:

The symposium approach is like a mountain sunrise: The peaks
are accentuated while the valleys remain in shadow. This symposium
of eleven authors surveying different aspects of criminal responsibility
is aimed at the "popular" level. To remain readable it rarely penetrates
deeper than the more elementary aspects of the subject. The editor
has sought to give the book a measure of unity and cohesion by supplying an introductory and a concluding chapter, an all-state table on
insanity as a defense, a list of the criteria of responsibility and the states
using each, and an index. To this reviewer, the psychiatric essay by
Dr. Davidson and the three legal essays by Judge Sobeloff and Professors
Weihofen and Wechsler were the most rewarding. Not to be overlooked is the fact that two of the best and most comprehensive texts in
this field-ForensicPsychiatry and Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense-were written by Dr. Davidson and Professor Weihofen respectively.
Some hint of the scope of the studies, the weight to be accorded them,
and the "professional angle of view" of the authors may be gained from
a brief listing of the contributors with their subjects and professions:
Dr. Henry Davidson (Psychiatry), the irresistible impulse; Dr. Donald
Cressey (Sociology), compulsive crime; Dr. Herbert Bloch (Sociology),
the legal, psychiatric and sociological "views" of a crime; Dr. William
Haines and John Zeidler (Psychiatry), disposition of a "criminal" found
insane; W. F. Burke (Psychiatry), the law-medicine conflict; Hon.
Simon Sobeloff (Judiciary) and Professor Henry Weihofen (Law
Teaching) each discusses discerningly the weakness of the "right and
wrong" test and persuasively urges the general adoption of the test of
the recent Durham case; Dr. Merrill Eaton, Jr. (Psychiatry), the
court-prison work of the psychiatrist; Dr. Michael Finn (Psychologist),
the psychologist as expert witness; and Professor Herbert Wechsler
(Law Teaching), an explanation of the American Law Institute's recent
formulation of the law of responsibility in criminal cases. Dr. Ralph
Winn (Psychology), introduced the entire series with a general discussion of the principle of punishment.
Since these commentators draw heavily on social science for their
concepts and arguments, the chief value of the book to lawyers is that
it brings to bear upon our tradition-bound legal thinking refreshing
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insights from scientists working in neighboring fields. Law needs cross-.
fertilization from the social sciences; even if it be granted that this book
is not the best possible proof of the value to law of such cross-fertilization, at least it is an effort in the right direction. Dr. Davidson's effort
to fit the various psychiatric categories of mental disorder into the
"right and wrong" legal test of responsibility is an excellent example of
the worthwhile contributions the scientific disciplines can make to
law. His analysis indicates that the explosive psychotics are the group
which law considers the true "insane" (irresponsible) while the compulsive neurotics, like the pyromaniacs and kleptomaniacs and the normal
individual who permits himself to fly into a blind rage, are legally "sane"
(responsible). If the application of the rule of McNaghten's case follows this distinction, the "right and wrong" test would undoubtedly be
on psychiatrically sounder ground than it is when applied in the
traditional manner.
Another practical contribution of psychiatry to legal thinking is
seen in the discussions of Sobeloff, Weihofen and Wechsler, the first
two advocating the Durham test (whether the act was the product of
mental disease) and the latter the A.L.I. proposal (whether he has
capacity to appreciate the criminality of the act and to conform his
The psychiatric weakness of the
conduct to legal requirements).
"right and wrong" test is that it is based on a discredited psychology
which considered cognition and volition as separate faculties, the latter
being controlled by the former, and made a test of knowledge determinative without considering whether the "whole" personality could control
conduct or not. Accordingly, if a man knows "right from wrong" but
is incapable of controlling the urge to do wrong, he is punished for an
act which he was powerless to prevent. The A.L.I. proposal seeks to
remedy this directly by expanding the "right and wrong rule" to include
volition; the Durham case solved it by asking whether the conduct is a
product of mental disease rather than of sane mind. The Durham rule
emphasizes the role of the psychiatrist and, accordingly, receives much
praise from the psychiatrists and lawyers with psychiatric leanings.
The A.L.I. rule is a more conservative reform resulting from extended
deliberations of lawyers; as such it may well influence the application
of the "right and wrong" rule in future cases. The law, being a conservative discipline, is more likely to modify an old rule than to substitute a completely new and largely untried test. Judge Sobeloff effectively presents the shortcomings of the "right and wrong" rule and the merits
of the Durham rule in remedying them; Professor Wechsler considering
the Durham rule vague strongly advocates the A.L.I. Penal Code rule
as clearer and more practical while at the same time reflecting the best
psychiatric thought of our time; Professor Weihofen carefully compares
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the pros and cons of the Durham rule and the A.L.I proposal, rejecting
the latter for the Durham rule. To a lawyer-reader, these three excellent essays are likely to outweigh all of the remainder of the book.
Little is said in the volume in defense of the "right and wrong" test
of McNaghten's case, which obtains in North Carolina and in the
majority of American jurisdictions. Beyond the legal essays, it has
little value as a workbook to a North Carolina lawyer preparing a case
for trial in this state. However, it seems to this reviewer (who has
probably read his weight in books on the mental element in law) that
it has a very real value in contributing to any lawyer's understanding of
the complex medico-legal problem of the mentally-disordered criminal,
and in indicating the direction of growth of the law of criminal responsibility. Most lawyers have learned (some, to their sorrow) that the
law is not static. Often, the ferment around the edges may be more
prophetic than the calm at the center; and, as the recent years have
shown us, the agitation at the periphery may move with astonishing
speed to the axis. Alert and astute lawyers know that not only professional pride, but even professional self-interest, demands that they
keep well-informed as to what the "gad-flys" are doing and thinking.
To such lawyers this volume will be welcome. There is fresh material
in abundance here for anyone wishing to examine an old problem of law
and society from a broader and sounder base against a more modern
background. In an age which is dashing rather headlong in the direction
of strict liability where lies punishment without fault, every lawyer
needs convictions-and those intelligently grounded-as to the punishment for acts not consciously known or voluntarily done.
DILLARD S. GARDNER
Marshal-Librarian,
North Carolina Supreme Court
Income Tax Differentials. By Dan Throop Smith, et al. Princeton:
Tax Institute. 1958. Pp. 258. $6.00.
The purpose of the symposium which this volume records was primarily to consider whether our present federal income tax needs reform
and, if so, in what respects it should be reformed. Practically all of
those who contribute formal papers point out what they consider serious
shortcomings in our present tax. But aside from fairly general recognition that our income tax problems would be fewer if tax rates were lower,
there is little agreement as to what the so-called "loopholes" and "inequities" in our tax law actually are, how they rank in relative urgency,
and what should be done about them.
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Income Tax Differentials is a significant publication, if for no other
reason than that it reveals the wide diversity of opinion in the United
States concerning the next steps in federal income tax reform. Whatever
one's pet project for income tax change may be, he is likely to find
convincing arguments both for and against it somewhere between the
covers of this book.
For those who are not interested in tax reform but merely in keeping
their personal income tax liability down to the lowest sum currently
permissible, Income Tax Differentials has substantial benefits to offer.
Many of the tax differentials in our present law turn out to be connected
with methods of tax avoidance and tax minimization. In presenting a
comprehensive list of the differentials as such, the symposium contributors also produce the most comprehensive list of legal methods of tax
minimization this reviewer has ever seen compressed within the limits of
one slim volume.
The authors of the sixteen papers are eminently qualified by training
and experience to deal with the subjects assigned to them. They
certainly do not express the ideas of any single group. Classified by
occupation, they include a Senator of the United States, a Deputy to the
Secretary of the Treasury, a member of the research staff of the AFLCIO, a staff official of the National Association of Manufacturers, the
Treasurer of a large corporation, a member of a firm of business consultants, five university professors specializing in taxation or finance,
three. tax attorneys, and two tax accountants. Several of the authors
were formerly members of the Internal Revenue Service. One of them
was formerly an H. M. Inspector of Taxes in London, England.
Most of the papers are carefully documented, not only with respect
to matters of law, tax regnlations, and court decisions, but also with
respect to pertinent statistics. In view of the complexity of the subjects
discussed, it would be unfair to the authors to attempt to summarize each
individual paper in a few sentences. Taken together, however, they give
us a superb picture of the facts of our present federal income tax
situation.
As far as the facts themselves are concerned there is little disagreement among the authors. They diverge widely only in their evaluation
of the facts and in the specific income tax changes which they conceive
these facts to call for. To the extent that it is possible to generalize
about any group of individuals who are accustomed to do their own
thinking, it might be said that three general attitudes toward income tax
reform are discernible. It must be added, however, that the specific
proposals of individual authors occasionally reflect the influence of more
than one of these attitudes.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37

Of the three distinguishable attitudes, one at least is based on an
extreme and uncompromising view of what constitutes taxable income.
According to this view, every conceivable benefit or potential benefit
accruing to an individual within a given year must be counted as part
of his taxable income; whether the benefit is received in cash, or in
kind; whether it is regularly recurring, or sporadic; whether it is subject to immediate disposition by the individual, or is merely a promise
or probability of future benefit; and whether it represents compensation
for productive services, or an unrealized increase in the market value
of capital assets. Qualitative differences in the various types of income
as thus defined are given no recognition. All incomes of the same
size, regardless of differences in their component elements, must be
taxed at the same effective rate. All income tax differentials, for instance, such as result from variations in non-business deductions, special
rate schedules for married taxpayers, dividend credits, percentage depletion, and the application of a special tax rate to long-term capital gains,
are ipso facto inequitable tax loopholes which should be abolished
forthwith.
A middle-of-the-road attitude is represented by those who accept
most of our present income tax differentials as being on balance justified
by considerations which relate either to equity, or to social or economic
policy, or to administrative feasibility. To those who share this attitude,
income tax reform means a reconsideration of all of our existing tax
differentials with a view to eliminating any which lack adequate justification on the above grounds. It also means extending the benefits of
specific types of differential treatment to additional groups of taxpayers
when similar considerations can be shown to apply.
A third attitude toward reform is associated with the belief that
income tax differentials are demanded by taxpayer groups and are
granted by Congress mainly because of the steep progression of our
present income tax rates. Were the present bracket rates reduced,
especially in the upper income reaches where they yield relatively little
revenue, the pressure for differential treatment of special types of income or special classes of taxpayers, it is claimed, would in large part
subside. A less steeply progressive schedule of rates, it is suggested,
would make it possible to abolish many of the present income tax
differentials. It would also reduce the attractiveness of various present
methods of tax postponement and avoidance.
None of the symposium contributors explore the probable revenue
consequences of this particular method of income tax reform with any
degree of thoroughness. The reason for this may possibly be that they
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doubt the political feasibility of reducing upper bracket rates unless
corresponding reductions in lower bracket rates are made at the same
time.
CtLaRNcE HEER
Kenan Professor of Economics, Emeritus
University of North Carolina

